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Why trust out-groups? The role of punishment under uncertainty    
Xiaofei Pan1 and Daniel Houser2 
We conducted a hidden-effort trust game, in which we assigned subjects to one of two groups. 
The groups, which were formed through two different group formation processes, included a 
“social” group that required sharing and exchange among its members, and a “non-social” group 
that did not. Once assigned, subjects participated in the game with members from both groups, 
either with or without the opportunity to punish a trustee who may have defected on them. We 
found that for investors in the non-social group, the opportunity to punish a trustee worked to 
promote trust, but only when the trustee was a member of the other group. For the social group, 
the opportunity to punish had no effect on the investors’ trust decisions, regardless of the 
trustee’s group. We provide a theoretical framework to explain this asymmetric effect of 
punishment on trust. Our results suggest that groups with identities founded in sharing and 
exchange—a feature of globalized societies—may find it less necessary to engage in costly 
punishment. As a result, they may enjoy gains in economic efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
           Across organizations, countries and cultures, individuals exhibit varying levels of trust 
and cooperation with those they regard as in-group or out-group members (Alesina Baqir and 
Easterly 1999, Bohnet et al. 2012, Buchan et al. 2009, Fukuyama 1995, Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi 1994). This can have important consequences, as the decision to trust or not trust 
others plays an important role in determining economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997, Zak 
and Knack 2001, Bottazzi Da Rin and Hellmann 2011). In part, this decision can stem from a 
group’s social norms, and the way these norms prescribe interactions with in- and out- groups3. 
For example, Fukuyama (1995) found that while a lineage-based family business in Southern 
China grew rapidly due to trust among group members, the family’s lack of trust of the out-
group (those outside their lineage) created barriers to further expansion. On the other hand, 
Buchan et al (2009) reported that people from more globalized countries behave cooperatively 
towards both in- and out- group members. An explanation is that people from the globalized 
countries recognize the benefits of sharing and exchange, and thus are more likely to draw broad 
group boundaries4.  
          Group identity defines the norms to which a group adheres (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). 
Eckel and Grossman (2005) found that groups created with interaction and cooperation during 
the group formation process are likely to believe in the cooperativeness of others and to 
contribute more in public goods games (Eckel and Grossman 2005). Group identity formation 
has also been shown to influence social preferences (Chen and Li 2009) and to impact the ability 
to coordinate (Charness et al 2007). Nonetheless, the literature has not yet examined whether a 
particular group identity formation process can influence members’ willingness to trust. Further, 
the literature is silent on the outcome of interactions between members of groups created under 
different processes. Specifically, little is known about how investors’ beliefs about the likelihood 
of reciprocity differ according to the social nature of their group identity, or how investors’ belief 
differences influence their interaction with in- or out-group members. 
                                                          
3 Social identity theory was first developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) and serves as a psychological basis for 
intergroup discrimination. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) were first to introduce social identity into 
economic analyses.  
4 Globalization strengthens cosmopolitan attitudes by weakening the relevance of ethnicity, locality and nationhood 
as sources of identification (Buchan et al. 2009). 
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            Beliefs about the likelihood of reciprocity can also be influenced by punishment 
institutions. It is well-established that punishment can promote cooperation (e.g. Fehr and 
Gachter 2000; Houser et al. 20085). A reason is that the ability to punish increases one’s 
confidence in other’s cooperativeness (or trustworthiness). This can be true even when 
interacting with counterparts from an out-group (Meyerson et al, 1996; Zucker, 1986).  
          A goal of this paper is to disentangle the impact of a group’s identity from the presence of 
punishment opportunities on investors’ trusting behaviors and their beliefs about in- or out-group 
trustees’ likelihood of reciprocity. It is difficult to separate these effects using data from natural 
environments. The reason is that the presence of punishment may be jointly determined with a 
group’s identity during the group’s formation process. For this reason, we conducted our study 
using controlled laboratory experiments.  
           In our experiment, we randomly assigned participants to an environment with or without 
punishment opportunities. We also randomly assigned them to one of two different group 
formation processes: a “social” process that involved substantial sharing and exchange among 
group members, and a “non-social” practice that required little or no sharing and exchange.         
          We developed and tested the hypothesis that punishment may have different effects on 
groups formed in these two different ways. We hypothesized that members of a group formed 
under a more social process may be more inclined to draw broader group boundaries and thus 
treat out-group members similarly to in-group members, even absent protection from a 
punishment institution. In contrast, a group formed without a social process might have narrower 
group boundaries and thus be reluctant to trust out-group members without the protection of 
punishment. As a result, punishment opportunities may not increase a social group member’s 
likelihood to trust an out-group member, but may increase a non-social member’s willingness to 
trust a member of an out-group. We refer this hypothesis as the “Asymmetric effect of 
punishment on trust.”  
           To test this hypothesis, our experiment included both a group formation stage and a trust 
game stage. In the group formation stage, we created two distinct group experiences through a 
puzzle game that varied in terms of the level of sharing and exchange needed for successful 
                                                          
5 Several previous studies have reported detrimental effects of punishment on trust  (see, e.g., Fehr and Rockenbach 
2003; Houser et al, 2008).  
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completion (Pan and Houser 2013, Eckel and Grossman 2005). One group was formed by 
working on a task that, in relation to the other group’s task, required significantly more 
cooperation (i.e., more sharing and exchanges among the group members as in globalized 
societies). We refer to the former group as Social and the latter as Non-Social.  
In the trust game stage, we randomly assigned participants to play the role of either an 
investor or a trustee in a two-period hidden-action trust game (a variant of the game in Charness 
and Dufwenberg 2006). The game was similar to a standard trust game, in that an investor could 
provide resources to a trustee, who then had an opportunity to reciprocate; however, our game 
added the possibility for defection, either by chance or as a result of a trustee choosing not to 
reciprocate. Although the investor knew this, she was not told the trustee’s decision.6 The 
hidden-action game was played in environments where punishment was possible and where it 
was not. In the Punishment condition, if the investor received a defection outcome, she could 
then reduce a trustee’s earnings at no cost to herself. We did not allow investors to punish if the 
trustee reciprocated (this eliminates antisocial punishment as reported, for example, by 
Herrmann et al 2008). Our experiment design is thus two-by-two, with two group identities 
(Social, Non-social) and two punishment conditions (Punishment and No Punishment). 
             We found clear evidence supporting the Asymmetric Effect of Punishment hypothesis. 
Specifically, we found that when punishment opportunities are available, a Non-social group 
investor is more willing to trust an out-group trustee than when punishment is absent. By 
contrast, Social investors trust out-group trustees no differently when punishment is available 
than when it is not. On the other hand, in neither group does punishment itself affect the 
investor’s trust towards an in-group trustee. We provide a belief-based theoretical framework to 
explain these observations, and show that it is consistent with beliefs we elicited from our 
participants. Finally, apart from our main investigation into the effect of punishment on trust, we 
also investigate whether investors from different groups might adopt different punishment 
strategies after receiving a defection payoff. We found that the Social investors use punishment 
significantly less frequently than their Non-social counterparts.  
            Our paper is divided into six parts. Section 2 discusses the recent research related to 
group identity formation and use of punishment. Section 3 introduces the experiment design, and 
                                                          
6 We use “she” to refer to an investor and “he” to refer to a trustee.  
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Section 4 describes our predictions. Section 5 presents our experimental results; Section 6 
discusses and concludes.  
 
2. Related literature on group identity and punishment  
Buchan et al. (2009) found that individuals from globalized societies draw broader group 
boundaries than individuals from countries with less globalization. As a result, these individuals 
are more cooperative and trusting and contribute more to public goods games7. Previous studies 
have also shown that different group formation processes can potentially influence members’ 
subsequent economic decisions. For identities created in the laboratory, Eckel and Grossman 
(2005) found that actions designed to enhance team identity, such as group problem solving, 
contributed to higher levels of team cooperation in public goods games. Charness, Rigotti and 
Rustichini (2007) found that only salient group membership affects individual behavior, while 
minimal group paradigm8 alone has little effect on individual behavior. Other studies have found 
that different experiences may have spillover impact on later economic decisions. Peysakhovich 
and Rand (2016) found in a laboratory experiment that individuals who experienced more 
cooperative environments were more likely to be prosocial in a subsequent game.  
          Previous studies examining the effect of group identity suggest that group identify can be 
formed through common belief systems. Masella et al. (2014) showed that an agent’s group 
identity influences their belief about principals’ controlling decisions and consequently 
influences agents’ transfer decisions (similar to reciprocity).  We thus view our paper as a 
complement to theirs.  Ockenfels and Werner (2014) focused on the role of beliefs in one’s 
giving behavior. They found that knowing whether the recipient shares identity with the dictator 
is important, in addition to knowing whether the dictator believes the recipient knows this. We 
again view our paper acts as a complement to this work. We contribute to this literature by 
studying how group identity influences “trust” decisions through the channel of beliefs9.  
                                                          
7 Rand et al (2008) illustrated that changing conflicts would make one draw different group boundaries to define 
their alliances. 
8 Tajfel and Turner (1986) described a set of criteria required for a group classification to be minimal. The 
conditions are: a) Subjects are randomly assigned to non-overlapping groups on the basis of some trivial tasks; b) 
No social interaction (like face-to-face or online chat) takes place between the subjects; c) Group membership is 
anonymous; and d) The decision tasks requires no link between a chooser’s self-interest and her choices. Creation of 
salient group membership often relaxed one or more of the above requirements.  
9 In a meta-analysis by Lane (2016), beliefs are also found to influence in-group favoritism decisions. 
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We followed the design of Eckel and Grossman (2005) by using their puzzle game and 
shuffling the puzzle pieces among the group members. In doing so, we aimed to create exchange 
and sharing (as occurs in globalized environments). By controlling the extent of sharing and 
exchange needed for puzzle completion, our design aimed to create different sharing and 
exchange norms among members of different groups, and potentially different group boundaries 
(Buchan et al 2009).  
              Previous research has also addressed punishment in trust games10. Some studies have 
found detrimental effects of sanctions, showing that they can reduce trustee reciprocity (Fehr and 
Rockenbach 2003; Falk and Kosfeld 2006, Houser et al. 2008). Very little research has studied 
the effect of punishment opportunities on investors’ trust decisions. Some works support the idea 
that punishment has a positive impact on people’s willingness to trust and cooperate. Yamagishi 
(1986) showed that people favor sanctioning systems when there is little trust in others’ 
cooperation. Knowing that one can punish a defector results in confidence and increases one’s 
willingness to trust. Some other papers report that sanctioning institutions may negatively affect 
trust. Mulder Dijk Cremer and Wilke (2006) found that participants who have experienced 
sanctioning systems can potentially be less trusting than those who have not.  
              Previous studies of the impact of identity on punishment have obtained mixed results. 
These studies often focus on third party punishment of a norm violator when the third party 
either does or does not share the victim’s identity (Goette et al 2006, Meier et al 2012a, 2012b).  
Bernhard et al (2006) studied a variety of conditions under which the third party punisher, the 
norm violator and the victim carry the same or different identities. Results are also mixed 
regarding how second parties punish violators (Chen and Li 2009; Weng and Carlsson 2012). 
 
3. Experiment Design  
Our experiment builds upon previous research on group identity formation (Eckel and Grossman 
(2005) and the hidden action trust game (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006). We used a two-by-
                                                          
10 Much literature has focused on 3rd-party punishment behavior (Bernhard et al 2006; Geotte et al 2006). Chen and 
Li (2009) studied punishment behavior from the 2nd party and found that one is more likely to forgive an in-group’s 
misbehavior.  
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two design: the two groups were Social, Non-social11; crossed with the two incentive conditions 
Punishment and No Punishment12. We obtained decisions from a total of 278 subjects. 136 were 
randomly assigned to the Social group, with 68 participating in the No Punishment condition and 
68 participating in the Punishment condition. The remaining 142 subjects were randomly 
assigned into the Non-social group, with 70 participating in the No Punishment condition and 72 
participating in the Punishment condition.  
         Our experiment paradigm consisted of two stages. The first stage was the group formation 
stage. Subjects assigned to the Social group had to solve a triangle puzzle, while subjects 
assigned to the Non-social group had to solve a square puzzle. We shuffled the puzzle pieces 
among the group members so that to finish his/her own puzzle, a group member had to find the 
right pieces from his/her other group members. In the Social condition, each group member 
received a sealed envelope containing three of the four unique pieces necessary to complete the 
puzzle, in addition to one duplicate piece (see Figure 1a). This made necessary significant 
cooperation and exchange of puzzle pieces among the group members. By contrast, those 
assigned to the Non-social group worked on a square puzzle that required less cooperation and 
less exchange of pieces among the group members. The reason is that each piece included a 
corner of the square, leaving it straightforward to solve the puzzle13. A group was not considered 
finished until all group members had completed their task. The group that finished first received 
an additional $2 for each group member. To avoid the effect of wealth differences on decisions 
in the trust game, subjects did not learn that they had won until they completed making their trust 
game decisions (see Puzzle instruction in Appendix A). 
                                                          
11 In each session, half of the subjects were randomly assigned to the Social group and the other half to the Non-
social group.  There were either 8 or 10 subjects in each session.  
12 The results of the No Punishment condition were initially reported in Pan and Houser (2013). The current paper 
studies the role of punishment on willingness to trust, and whether Social and Non-social groups use and respond to 
punishment differently. Pan and Houser (2013) focuses exclusively on how the group formation process affects trust 
decisions.  
13 Those who worked on the social task (Triangle puzzles) spent significantly more time than those who worked on 
the non-social task (square puzzles) (218 seconds vs. 102 seconds, p < 0.05). Further, we recorded the number of 
puzzle piece exchanges by comparing the specific pieces used in each member’s finished puzzle to the specific 
pieces initially distributed to each person. People who spent more time finishing the task (also more likely to be in 
the Social group engaged in more exchange of puzzle pieces (mean = 72% new pieces), compared with those who 
exchanged fewer pieces (mean = 30%, p < 0.01).  
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           After the group formation stage, participants played the trust game for two periods. 
Participants knew that they would be randomly matched with a different counterpart in each 
period. They also knew that one of the periods would be randomly chosen to determine the pair’s 
earnings. The trust game was based on the hidden action trust game used by Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006, Figure 2a). We used the strategy method14 to elicit participants’ decisions 
regarding in-group and out-group members.  
       At the beginning of the first period, each investor made two decisions about whether to trust 
(i.e., to choose IN or OUT). In one decision they were asked to assume they were matched with 
an in-group trustee, and in the other they were asked to assume they were matched with an out-
group trustee. Similarly, trustees were asked to decide whether to reciprocate (i.e., choose to roll 
a die or not) if they were matched with an in- or an out- group investor. The game was a hidden 
effort trust game in that reciprocation by trustees was not observable to investors: there was a 
one-in-six chance that reciprocating would lead to the same outcome as defection.  
 
Figure 1.  Group formation stage 
Each triangle puzzle was cut with only one right angle (as seen as piece #1). Each square puzzle 
included a right angle on each piece, making it relatively easier to solve.   
 
  
 
      Closed Door  
 
        
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Strategy method allowed us to collect more data and conduct within subject comparison. The main disadvantage 
of the strategy method is that it could potentially diminish the effect of emotions. However, as our focus was to 
compare between the groups formed under social and non-social environments, such diminished effect, if any, 
would have been identical across the two conditions.  
  
Cooperative group            
   
Non-cooperative group 
4 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
2 
3 
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Figure 2: Hidden action trust game. 
Figure 2a. Hidden action trust game absent punishment. Figure 2b. Hidden action trust game with 
punishment. NP represents Not to punish, P represents punish. In both Figure a and b, nature decides, if 
B ever rolls, it is a success or a failure. A represents an investor, and B represents a trustee.  
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
        
 
In Period Two, the investors and trustees were matched with new counterparts. They were asked 
to make decisions in Period 2 conditional on all possible Period 1 outcomes. For example, if an 
investor chose IN for both an in-group trustee and an out-group trustee in Period 1, then this 
would result in four possible outcomes in period 2, as described below. 
Period 2: Four outcome scenarios for an investor who chose to trust both an in-group and out-
group member in Period 115 
1. If you received $0 from your in-group16 trustee 
2. If you received $12 from your in-group trustee 
3. If you received $0 from your out-group trustee 
4. If you received $12 from your out-group trustee 
                                                          
15 On the other hand, those who only chose IN for in-group and OUT for out-group trustee could face only three 
possible scenarios: the first two would be identical to the table above, while the third (also the last) would be: “If 
you received $5 from your out-group trustee.” Similarly, those who chose OUT for both in- and out-group trustee 
would only face two scenarios. 
16 The word “in-group” is replaced by the respective group the participant belongs to. For instance, an investor that 
plays the square puzzle would see a square icon to replace in-group and the triangle icon to replace the word “out-
group”.  
 Success 
[p=5/6] 
  
a 
In 
Don’t Roll 
Out 
A 
(5, 5)  
Failure 
[p=1/6] 
  
 (0, 10) 
B 
(0, 14)  
(12, 10) 
 (12, 10) 
b 
In 
A 
Out 
A 
(5, 5)  
 Failure 
[p=1/6] 
  
 Success 
[p=5/6] 
  
Nature 
Don’t  
Roll 
Roll 
 (0, 10) 
B 
(0, 8) 
P NP 
(0, 14) 
P NP 
(0, 4) 
Roll 
Nature 
A 
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Conditional on each of these outcomes, and conditional on being matched with an in-group or 
out-group trustee, an investor would decide whether to trust or not trust in the second period. 
Thus, an investor would have up to eight strategy-method decisions to make in Period 2.17 
 
Treatments  
We studied two incentive conditions: No punishment and Punishment. These two conditions 
differed in the trust game stage. Under punishment, everything was identical to No Punishment, 
except that an investor who received $0 could decide whether to reduce $6 of the trustee’s 
earnings in each period at no cost18 to the investor (see Figure 2b). However, an investor could 
not know for certain whether this $0 was due to defection (the trustee chose Don’t Roll) or if the 
trustee chose to Roll but was unlucky. An investor could not reduce the trustee’s earnings if she 
chose OUT (and received $5) or if she chose IN and received $12 (i.e., the trustee chose to Roll 
and was lucky) (see sample Instructions in Appendix A).  
 
Survey 
After players finished their decisions, and before seeing the outcome, they were also incentivized 
to predict the decisions of their counterpart19. We asked investors: “How many of the trustees do 
you believe in Period 1 chose to ROLL for an A from their own (other) group?20” We asked 
trustees: “How many of investors do you believe in Period 1 chose IN for a B from their own 
(other) group?” Participants were paid $1 for each correct answer. In the Punishment condition, 
we further asked trustees to predict how many of those A who had chosen IN would choose to 
                                                          
17 Trustees in Period 2 also made decisions conditional on their possible Period 1 payoffs.  
18 We chose a costless rather than costly punishment, as we aimed to capture an environment where punishment is 
easy to implement and is salient to the one who might be punished. In many firms, for example, supervisors can 
easily “write-up” an employee for improper behavior, and doing so can have substantial negative consequences for 
the supervisee. Moreover, as our goal was to understand not only the impact of punishment but also how it might 
change depending on social identities, we wanted to ensure that punishment had the best chance to be used and was 
not deterred as a result of cost.  
19 Our belief elicitation is incentivized and occurs after subjects have finished their decisions. This procedure has 
been shown to produce accurate belief elicitations (Gachter and Renner 2010) and to avoid contamination of 
decisions during the experiment (Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker 2008). Despite this, it is possible that beliefs are 
impacted by decisions made in the game. 
20 In the experiment, trustees were referred to as being in Role B, while investors were in Role A. Players also 
received $1 if their answer was correct. We also reminded the players about the number of Role B’s in the room.  
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punish if they receive zero. These answers helped us to determine whether investors’ decision to 
punish changed with their beliefs regarding trustees’ Roll (reciprocation) rates.  
 
Experimental Procedure 
We conducted all sessions at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science laboratory using 
z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Table 1 shows characteristics of the subjects who participated in the 
two conditions: these characteristics are not statistically significantly different (see Table B1 in 
Appendix B).  
             Upon arriving, subjects were seated in separate booths, so that they could neither see each 
other nor communicate before the experiment began. Before making decisions, subjects were 
randomly assigned an ID number, which determined their group and role in the group. Each group 
worked on the puzzle task in a different room with an experimenter present (standing at a distance). 
After the puzzle stage, all participants went back to their booths and all decisions in the trust game 
were made privately and anonymously through the computer interface. All sessions were finished 
within an hour. Subjects earned an average of $13, including a $5 show-up bonus.   
 
Table 1: Summary statistics and comparison across treatments 
 No Punishment Punishment  
Male 0.58 0.54 
Caucasian 0.4121 0.40 
African American 0.086 0.157 
Asian 0.37 0.36 
Hispanic  0.086 0.064 
Other racial/Ethnic group  0.047 0.021 
Observations  138  140 
 
                                                          
21 All races reported under No Punishment are based on an observation of 128 rather than the entire data set 138 of 
the treatment due to missing reports.  
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4. Theoretical predictions 
Trust decision 
             Assume investor i derives utility from earnings 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 as well as the trustee’s earnings 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗22. 
If she chooses OUT (not to trust), both the investor and the trustee receive $5 (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = 5), and 
the game ends. However, when she chooses IN, her expected payment is dependent upon the 
trustee j’s decision and, if the trustee chooses Roll, the outcome of that die roll.  
             Assuming the investor’s utility is linear in her earnings and that of the trustee, we can 
express her expected utility of the trust decision as follows.  
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is the utility weight investor i assigns to her (expected) earnings 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 (henceforth, 
𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) and 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0,1] is the weight i assigns to trustee j’s (expected) earnings, (henceforth 𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗)23.  
Let 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 denote investor i’s subjective belief regarding trustee j’s likelihood of 
reciprocating (to Roll). Suppose that investor i’s belief is a function of the absolute amount of 
punishment that i can impose upon the trustee j were he to “betray”: 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓(|𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗|). Suppose 
further that 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 monotonically increases in �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�, with 𝑓𝑓′ > 0,𝑓𝑓′′ < 0. Note that in the No 
punishment condition |𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗| = 0, while in Punishment �𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� = 6. Finally, we require that the 
belief follows 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0,1]. 
 Investor i compares the expected utility she receives from choosing IN (see <1>) to the 
expected utility she receives from staying out (see <2>). 
 
𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗             <1> where     𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∗ �16 ∗ 0 + 56 ∗ 12� + �1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� ∗ 0 = 10𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗               𝐸𝐸𝜋𝜋𝑗𝑗 = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∗ 10 + �1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗� ∗ 14 = 14 − 4𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗24    𝑈𝑈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = 5𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 5𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗                                 <2> 
                                                          
22 This utility set up is similar to that of Chen and Li (2009)’s group identity model. 
23 The weight parameter varies with identity and group boundaries. For example, an investor from the Social group 
may have an identical 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗  for both in-group and out-group trustees, while an investor from the Non-social group 
could have a higher  𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗  for the in-group than out-group trustees. 
24  The specification of this model, which assumes that an investor cares both about self and the trustee would 
predict no punishment from the investor.  
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An investor chooses IN whenever 𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 𝑈𝑈𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 .  Without loss of generality, set 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 1, meaning the condition for choosing IN is:                                           𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 > 14𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−914𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−4 25           
We will refer to this belief 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 14𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−914𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−4, that leaves the investor indifferent between choosing 
IN and OUT, as the threshold belief.  
 
Proposition 1: The threshold belief 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 increases with 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 and decreases with 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗. That is, the 
relatively more (less) an investor cares about her own earnings and thus relatively less (more) 
about the other’s earnings, the higher (lower) is the threshold belief required for an investor to 
choose IN.  
 
       We illustrate this effect in Figure 3a and 3b. Panel a assumes that an investor cares both 
about herself and about her counterpart: 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0.7 and 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 = 0.3 so that 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 14𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−914𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−4 =0.1426. By contrast, panel b assumes that an investor only cares about herself, with 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 =0, 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 14𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−914𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖−4 = 0.5. Thus, the threshold belief increases from 0.14 to 0.5 after an increase 
in 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖.  
 
Proposition 2: An investor will choose “Out” if her belief under no punishment is lower than the 
threshold belief and will choose IN if her belief under punishment is higher than the threshold 
belief.  
 
            This proposition implies that punishment is ineffective when beliefs under no punishment 
and punishment are on the same side of the threshold belief. By contrast, punishment promotes 
trust when these beliefs are on the opposite sides of the threshold belief. In particular, when the 
belief under no punishment is lower than the threshold belief, the model predicts the investor will 
                                                          
25 This framework aims to explain the conditions under which an investor may trust or not trust based on her belief. 
It does not aim to explain why she holds that belief in the first place.  
26 Note that we chose these number to illustrate the basic idea of the model. It could well be the case that the utility 
function is not linear and the number would vary.  
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choose OUT, while the belief under punishment is higher than the threshold belief, the model 
predicts the investor to choose IN. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. a. Punishment has no effect on changing the behavior of an investor who initially trusts. 
Points A and B represent the investor’s belief regarding the trustee’s roll rate under No punishment (A) 
and Punishment (B). The threshold belief is shown using a dashed line. This happens when the belief 
under no punishment (point A) and belief under punishment (point B) are on the same side of the 
threshold belief. b. Punishment changes an investor’s behavior from Out (no trust) to In (trust). This 
happens when the belief under no punishment (point A) and belief under punishment (point B) are on the 
opposite sides of the threshold belief. 
 
  
Predictions 
 
         In our experiment, Social investors experienced more exchange and sharing during the 
group formation process. If this results in broader group boundaries, as suggested by Buchan et 
al, then Social investors might be more willing to believe in both in- and out-group member’s 
willingness to reciprocate absent punishment (e.g. Point A in panel 3a). Moreover, Social 
investors might also place greater weight on trustee earnings (an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 and a decrease in 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖), which implies a lower threshold belief to trust (
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗
< 0, see the dashed line in Figure 3a 
compared to that in 3b). As a result, both the beliefs with and without punishment are likely to be 
above the threshold level (on the same side of the threshold line), leaving punishment ineffective 
in changing trust decisions (Figure 3a, point A to B).  
        On the other hand, an investor from the Non-social group may draw relatively narrower 
group boundaries, and thus be less willing to believe in an out-group trustee’s willingness to 
reciprocate. This belief may be even lower when punishment is absent (Figure 3b, point A). 
Further, they may put little weight on an out-group member’s payoffs (corresponding to a 
a) b) 
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decrease in 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 and an increase in 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖), implying a higher threshold belief (
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
> 0) that must 
be passed in order for a Non-social investor to trust an out-group member (see dashed line in 
Figure 3b in comparison to that in Figure 3a). Punishment increases the belief that an out-group 
trustee will reciprocate, perhaps increasing it above the threshold belief level. As a result, the 
beliefs under no punishment and that under punishment are likely to be on the opposite sides of 
the threshold belief level. This means that punishment may potentially change Non-social 
investors’ decisions regarding whether to trust an out-group member (Figure 3b, point A to B).  
 
5. Results  
Our interests are in the effect of punishment on Social and Non-social investors’ trust decisions 
and we are also interested in how Social and Non-social group investors punish., so we first 
focus on an investor’s Period 1 trust and punishment decisions. At the end of this section, we 
report trustees’ reciprocity decisions. In the discussion section, we offer thoughts on the 
mechanism underlying punishment decisions, and examine the effect of punishment 
opportunities on both trust and reciprocity.  
 
5.1. Asymmetric effect of punishment on trust  
Our results support the Asymmetric Effect of Punishment on trust hypothesis as described by the 
Propositions. We provide evidence first by comparing the trust frequencies between punishment 
and no punishment directly (see Figure 4) and we then use regressions to examine the effect of 
punishment after controlling for other variables (Table 2). We also show the robustness of this 
asymmetric effect of punishment by comparing the in-group favoritism between the two groups, 
both for the initial trust and after the investors are betrayed (Figure 5). We further explore the 
connection between belief and punishment by reporting beliefs when the environment includes 
or does not include punishment opportunities (Table 3). Finally, we provide regression evidence 
that the presence of punishment opportunities per se does not change behavior, but behavior 
changes can be explained entirely by the way punishment changes beliefs (Table 4).  
 
RESULT 1: After controlling for other factors, punishment increases Non-social group 
investors’ trust only towards out-group trustees. Punishment has no effect on a Social investor’s 
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trust towards an out-group member. Punishment also has no impact on trust towards an in-
group trustee for either group’s investors.  
 
           Figure 4 reports that punishment promotes Non-social investors’ trust towards out-group 
trustees (0.56 vs. 0.29, p < 0.05, two-sided Mann-Whitney test27), but not towards the in-group28. 
Social investors display no change in behavior as a result of punishment opportunities for either 
in-group or out-group trustees (In-group: 0.74 vs. 0.74, out-group: 0.59 vs. 0.59, p > 0.1). This 
result provides initial evidence for the “Asymmetric effect of punishment on trust.”  
 
Figure 4 Trust frequency of investors in the Social and Non-social groups towards in-group and out-group 
trustees under No Punishment and Punishment conditions. P represents Punishment, NP stands for No-
punishment. Numbers of observations are in parenthethes. The filled bar illustrates investors’ trust towards in-group 
members. The open bar shows investors’ trust towards out-group members.  
 
          Using an OLS regression controlling for the investor’s group (a dummy for Social or Not), 
the punishment condition or not, and gender and session effects, we find punishment to 
significantly increase Non-social investors’ trust towards out-group trustees (Column 5, Table 2, 
coefficient for punishment = 0.258, p < 0.05). We also find that being a Social investor promotes 
trust after taking into account the effect of punishment (Column 4, coefficient = 0.177, p < 0.05). 
We do not find punishment to change either investor’s trust towards in-group trustees (Column 2 
and 3, p > 0.1).  
 
                                                          
27 Unless otherwise reported, all statistics are results from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. 
28 To further identify the effect of punishment on trust, we ran two control treatments without the group identity 
formation process, one without punishment Control_NP, and one with punishment Control_P. Our results show 
punishment has a positive, but only marginal impact on promoting trust. The significant effect of punishment on a 
Non-social group’s willingness to trust is largely driven by substantial out-group discrimination when punishment is 
absent. These results are detailed in Appendix B. 
0.74 0.74 0.69
0.78
0.59 0.59
0.29
0.56
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Social_NP(34) Social_P (34) NonSocial_NP (35) NonSocial_P (36)
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Table 2: Effect of punishment on initial trust 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In-group Out-group 
 All Non-social Social All Non-social Social 
       
Punishment 0.045 0.091 -0.025 0.127 0.258** -0.020 
 (0.076) (0.098) (0.116) (0.079) (0.118) (0.112) 
Social group 0.007   0.177**   
 (0.077)   (0.086)   
Male -0.068 -0.142 0.021 0.072 0.131 0.055 
 (0.084) (0.136) (0.126) (0.088) (0.140) (0.126) 
Session  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.912*** 0.849*** 0.997*** 0.039 0.018 0.218 
 (0.125) (0.190) (0.115) (0.169) (0.176) (0.286) 
Observations 139 71 68 139 71 68 
R-squared 0.171 0.213 0.321 0.153 0.225 0.247 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
RESULT 2: The asymmetric effect of punishment is robust to a diff-in-diff analysis, by 
comparing the in-group favoritism between the Social and the Non-social group. This effect also 
persists after an investor is betrayed.   
We conducted a diff-in-diff analysis between in- and out-groups, which shows in-group 
favoritism (trust towards an in-group “mirrors” trust towards an out-group) by Social and Non-
social group members. In-group favoritism among the Non-social group is much larger than the 
Social group when punishment is absent (Figure 5a, mean = 0.4 vs. 0.15, p < 0.05, two-sided M-
W test), while such favoritism difference disappears with punishment (Figure 5a, 0.22 vs 0.15, p 
= 0.64, two-sided M-W test). This pattern persists even after betrayal, where in-group favoritism 
under no punishment tends to be larger among the Non-social group than that under the Social 
group (Figure 5b, mean = 0.21 vs 0, p < 0.1, one-sided M-W test). In contrast, in-group 
favoritism between Social and Non-social group is not significantly different under punishment 
(mean = 0.11 vs 0, p = 0.46, two-sided M-W test). When betrayed by an out-group member, the 
bar continues to describe a similar trend, though the difference between the Social and Non-
social group is not significant (Figure 5c, p > 0.5 for comparison under No punishment and 
Punishment). 
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Figure 5: In-group favoritism by Social and Non-social groups. Each bar is calculated as the 
difference between one’s trust towards in-group and that towards an out-group (“In-group – Out-group”), 
also, the in-group favoritism. The solid black bar represents the in-group favoritism of the Non-social 
group while the solid white bar represents that of the Social group. Panel a shows the in-group favoritism 
for the first time trust, while Panel b and Panel c show what happens if they are betrayed.  
 
RESULT 3: Social and Non-social investors’ beliefs regarding in-group trustees’ roll rates are 
independent of the presence of punishment. Both groups investors’ beliefs about out-group 
trustees’ reciprocation rates increase when punishment is present. 
 
           We conducted an incentivized belief elicitation after investors completed their decisions, 
but before their results were revealed. In particular, after showing them the number of trustees in 
their session, we asked them: “How many of the trustees do you believe in Period 1 chose to 
ROLL for an investor from their own (other) group?” With in-groups, punishment has no effect 
on the Social (0.65 vs 0.74) or the Non-social (0.60 vs. 0.65) investors’ beliefs regarding 
0.4
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trustees’ reciprocation rates (p > 0.1 for both, see Table 3)29. Yet, for both Social (0.47 vs 0.68) 
and Non-social (0.26 vs 0.49) investors, punishment contributes to significantly increasing 
investors’ beliefs regarding out-group trustees’ reciprocation rates (p < 0.01). We also compared 
the beliefs between the Social and Non-social investors. We find the beliefs of Social investors to 
be significantly higher than the Non-social investors only towards out-group trustees but both 
with (0.68 vs. 0.49, p < 0.05) and without punishment (0.47 vs. 0.26, p < 0.01). Yet, we do not 
find the belief of Social investors to be different from the Non-social investors towards in-group 
trustees both with (0.74 vs 0.65, p > 0.1) and without punishment (0.65 vs 0.60, p > 0.1).  
         
Table 3: Investors’ beliefs regarding trustees’ reciprocation rates  
 
 
 
In-group  Out-group 
Social 
(n=34, 34) 
Non-social 
(n=35, 36) M-W test 
Social 
(n=34, 34) 
Non-social 
(n=35, 36) M-W test 
No-
Punishment 0.65 0.60 P = 0.41 0.47 0.26 P < 0.01 
Punishment  0.74 0.65 P = 0.17  0.68 0.49 P < 0.05 
M-W test P=0.21 P=0.45   P < 0.01 P < 0.01  
 
RESULT 4: After controlling for beliefs, punishment does not have any additional impact on 
trust decisions.   
 
Result 3 shows that investors believe reciprocity is more likely when punishment is possible.  
Result 4 reports a regression similar to that in Table 2, but with investors’ beliefs of trustees’ 
reciprocation rate added as a regressor. Beliefs are highly significant across all conditions (p < 
0.05), but punishment is not significant for any condition (Table 4, p > 0.1) 30. This suggests that 
the significant effect of punishment reported in Table 2 operates through the channel of beliefs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29 We assume that beliefs are monotonically increasing in the level of the punishment threat, with f’>0, f’’<0. 
Results in Table 3 support this assumption.  
30 These results are robust to a probit regression analysis (See Table B2 in appendix B).  
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Table 4: Effect of punishment and belief on trust  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In-group Out-group 
VARIABLES All Non-social Social All Non-social Social 
Belief 0.590*** 0.526** 0.652*** 0.657*** 0.594*** 0.684*** 
 (0.115) (0.238) (0.177) (0.133) (0.203) (0.141) 
Punishment -0.005 0.072 -0.103 -0.005 0.122 -0.139 
 (0.073) (0.099) (0.107) (0.084) (0.128) (0.114) 
Social group -0.039   0.055   
 (0.073)   (0.092)   
Male -0.045 -0.071 0.027 0.091 0.136 0.103 
 (0.077) (0.133) (0.123) (0.085) (0.125) (0.131) 
Session  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Constant 0.543*** 0.514 0.516*** -0.033 -0.138 0.123 
 (0.204) (0.326) (0.170) (0.173) (0.212) (0.333) 
Observations 137 71 66 137 71 66 
R-squared 0.306 0.294 0.481 0.295 0.319 0.395 
 
Notes: The regression is based on the form:  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 where Covariate is listed to the 
left in the row and 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 are the session fixed effects. The p-value is based on robust standard error in parentheses.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
5.2 Punishment behaviors  
 
RESULT 5: Investors from the Non-social group use punishment significantly more frequently 
than their Social counterparts.  
            Compared to their Non-social counterparts (n = 48, mean = 0.67), significantly fewer 
Social investors (n = 41, mean = 0.46) chose to reduce trustees’ earnings when they received 
zero (p < 0.1, Figure 6). By controlling for whether one is from the Social or Non-social group, 
beliefs, investor’s gender, whether the trustee is from the same group and session effects, we find 
an investor from the Social group is less likely to choose to use punishment31 (see Table 4, 
Column 1, coefficient for being a social group member = - 0.314, p < 0.01).  
           This result remains significant after controlling for an investor’s belief in a trustee’s roll 
rate (Column 2, coefficient for membership = - 0. 235, p < 0.01). We further investigated the 
determinants of punishment by: 1) whether the trustee is from the same or other group (Columns 
                                                          
31 This result is robust to using a probit regression (p < 0.01).  
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3 and 4). We find that belief plays no role in the decision to punish an in-group member. In 
contrast, an increasing belief in trustees’ reciprocation rates contributes to reducing punishment 
towards out-group members (Column 4, coefficient = -0.623, p < 0.05). In Column 5- 10, we 
disaggregate the data by Non-social group (Column 5-7) or Social group (Columns 8-10). We 
find beliefs to play no role for a Social investor regardless whether it is an in-group or an out-
group trustee (p > 0.1 for both, Column 9 and 10). We also find beliefs to have no effect on 
punishment towards in-group trustee among the Non-social investors (p > 0.1, Column 6). We 
find, however, that punishment decreases with increasing beliefs about the out-group trustees’ 
reciprocation rates among the Non-social investors (p < 0.05, Column 7).  
 
Figure 6: Frequency of punishment by Social and Non-social groups. Numbers in parentheses indicate the 
number of observations underlying each bar. The number above each bar indicates the mean frequency of 
punishment decisions. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Punishment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES All All In-group Out-
group 
Non-
social 
NonSoc- 
In 
NonSoc- 
Out 
Social Social- 
In 
Social-Out 
Belief  -0.478** -0.402 -0.623** -0.688** -0.369 -0.863** 0.189 0.387 0.357 
  (0.192) (0.246) (0.281) (0.300) (0.588) (0.331) (0.584) (0.780) (1.136) 
Social group  -0.314*** -0.235** -0.271* -0.165       
 (0.116) (0.112) (0.137) (0.134)       
Male 0.143 0.134 0.076 0.225 0.079 0.009 0.317 -0.058 0.038 -0.464 
 (0.147) (0.133) (0.145) (0.187) (0.176) (0.249) (0.205) (0.290) (0.407) (0.812) 
In-group -0.041 -0.003   0.061   -0.069   
 (0.073) (0.074)   (0.120)   (0.136)   
Session  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 89 89 51 38 48 28 20 41 23 18 
R-squared 0.338 0.386 0.460 0.534 0.491 0.501 0.804 0.427 0.627 0.563 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.3 Trustees’ behavior  
RESULT 6: For both Social and Non-social trustees, the frequency of reciprocity towards in-
group members is not impacted by punishment opportunities. Trustees are more likely to 
reciprocate to out-group investors when punishment opportunities exist.  
         After controlling for whether there is punishment, whether one is from the Social or Non-
Social group, the gender of the trustee, and using an OLS regression with robust standard errors 
clustered by subject, we find punishment to increase trustees’ reciprocity towards out-group 
investors when there is an opportunity to punish (p < 0.1, Column 4, Table 5). Punishment does 
not impact the likelihood a trustee will reciprocate an in-group investor (p > 0.1, Column 1, 
Table 5). Social trustees do not reciprocate differently than the Non-social group trustees. If we 
control for trustees’ beliefs regarding investors’ likelihood to punish then we find the 
significance of punishment vanishes (p > 0.1, Column1, Table 6). Further, beliefs regarding the 
investor’s likelihood to punish do influence Non-social trustees’ reciprocity decisions (p < 0.05, 
Column 5, Table 6), but do not influence the Social group trustees (p > 0.1, Column 6, Table 6).   
Table 5: Determinants of Reciprocal decisions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In-group Out-group 
VARIABLES All Non-social Social All Non-social Social  
Punishment 0.033 -0.116 0.176 0.164* 0.160 0.169 
 (0.083) (0.113) (0.130) (0.089) (0.114) (0.140) 
Social group -0.088        -0.005   
 (0.077)   (0.084)   
Male -0.099 -0.095 -0.117 -0.017 -0.029 -0.076 
 (0.092) (0.123) (0.126) (0.094) (0.142) (0.121) 
 (0.226) (0.107) (0.482) (0.288) (0.345) (0.458) 
Constant 0.956*** 1.058*** 0.800*** 0.269 -0.080 0.578*** 
 (0.093) (0.056) (0.190) (0.173) (0.057) (0.164) 
Observations 135 66 69 135 66 69 
R-squared 0.266 0.270 0.365 0.160 0.374 0.209 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Determinants of Reciprocal decisions after controlling for belief 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In-group Out-group 
VARIABLES All Non-social Social All Non-social Social 
       
believeAreduce6 
_percent 
-0.086 0.084 -0.353 0.341 0.627** 0.189 
 (0.177) (0.251) (0.332) (0.227) (0.244) (0.435) 
Punishment 0.067 -0.157 0.321 -0.018 -0.122 0.044 
 (0.120) (0.157) (0.196) (0.139) (0.169) (0.251) 
Social group -0.095   -0.022   
 (0.077)   (0.084)   
Male -0.102 -0.092 -0.107 -0.054 -0.086 -0.087 
 (0.094) (0.127) (0.127) (0.097) (0.132) (0.135) 
       
Constant 0.926*** 1.047*** 0.738** 0.161 0.022 0.391 
 (0.126) (0.069) (0.306) (0.160) (0.079) (0.317) 
Session  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 133 66 67 133 66 67 
R-squared 0.262 0.271 0.369 0.193 0.445 0.206 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
6. Discussions and conclusions 
6.1. Ineffectiveness of punishment on reciprocity  
The insignificant difference between Social and Non-social trustees is consistent with the 
literature showing that trust is more easily manipulated than trustworthiness (Al-Ubaydli et al 
2013). This may also be related to the finding that reciprocity is a social norm, while trust is not 
(Bicchieri et al. 2011). That we find punishment is often ineffective in increasing reciprocity 
rates is also in line with results from previous studies which find either ineffective or detrimental 
effects of sanctions on reciprocity (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003, Falk and Kosfeld 2006, Houser 
et al. 2008).  
 
6.2. Explaining Punishment behavior  
Punishment decisions in our environment are driven by social preferences: our experiment 
design ensures that punishment cannot be driven by strategic concerns32. Predictions of 
                                                          
32 An investor can punish a potential violator in order to promote more positive future interactions with other in-
group or out-group members. However, neither the trustee nor the investor learn their outcome until the end of the 
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prominent social preference models indicate one would choose to punish if she is inequity averse 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999), independent of her belief regarding trustees’ roll rates. In contrast, she 
would choose not to punish if she is efficiency driven and cares about the interests of the trustee, 
again independent of her beliefs (Andreoni and Miller 2002). The only scenario where one’s 
punishment behavior is influenced by beliefs is when an investor has a preference for reciprocity 
(Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). In this case she would be less likely to punish when she 
believes it is more likely that the trustee will reciprocate .  
            In Table 4, we find punishment behaviors to be independent of investors’ beliefs when 
they are from the Social group (coefficient for “belief” > 0.1, Columns 8 – 10) or for both groups 
when punishment is towards an in-group member (Column 6 and 9, p > 0.1). This is consistent 
with behaviors of both inequity averse investors and efficiency driven investors. Yet, our results 
further showed that being a Social investor alone leaves one less likely to punish (Column 1, 
coefficient for “Social group”, p < 0.01), suggesting that Social investors are more likely to be 
efficiency driven. This result is robust to controlling for beliefs over trustee’s roll rates (Column 
2, p < 0.05) 
            By contrast, we find that an increased belief in an out-group trustee’s roll rate reduces a 
Non-social investor’s likelihood to punish (Column 7, p < 0.05). This dependency of punishment 
on beliefs suggests that Non-social investors are reciprocal and punish trustees when they believe 
less in the likelihood of reciprocity. This is consistent with the prediction of the intention based 
reciprocity model (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).  
 
6.3. Group boundaries  
           Our study extends the literature on group boundaries (Buchan et al. 2009, Rand et al. 
2009). Our group formation process allows us to observe how Social and Non-social investors 
respond to the presence of punishment opportunities when it comes to interactions with in-group 
and out-group members. Moreover, while a bad outcome is certainly a result of a norm violation 
in traditional trust game (Berg et al 1995), here, a bad outcome can be purely due to bad luck 
                                                          
game and this is common knowledge. Therefore, the investor’s punishment is more likely to be driven by social 
preference.  
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with good intentions. Thus, our results also shed light on how the group formation process helps 
to promote trust in a world with uncertainty and noise (Fudenberg Rand and Dreber 2010).   
           Our results also complement studies that investigate the underlying mechanism for 
unjustified blame towards a trustee who can have little control over a bad outcome (Baron and 
Hershey 1988, Gurdal et al, 2013, Rubin and Sheremeta 2015, Pan and Xiao 2016). Our paper 
provides another possible explanation for such blame; that is, depending on how their groups are 
formed, those with group norms that involve more sharing and exchange  draw broader group 
boundaries, are more likely to treat an out-group counterpart similarly to an in-group counterpart, 
and are more forgiving towards those who may have defected.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Our study reveals that the way a group forms can impact its behavior, and in particular that 
“global” groups founded in social sharing and exchange activity can draw broader group 
boundaries than “local” groups that form in the absence of such pro-social activities. We 
developed a model, and empirical support for this model, showing that differences in beliefs 
underlie these different group boundaries. In particular, investors from Social groups are much 
more likely to believe that an out-group trustee will reciprocate than are investors from Non-
social groups.  
In our model, an investor has no incentive to punish a trustee even when a trustee's choice could 
lead the investor to receive zero. The reason is that utility is positively (at least non-negatively) 
impacted by both one's own and one's counterpart’s earnings. Alternative social preferences, say 
involving envy, might imply that an investor's utility would be negatively impacted by trustees 
who receive positive earnings when an investor receives zero. While investigating this is outside 
the scope of our paper, it would be profitable for future research to explore both theoretically and 
experimentally the rich punishment and trust decisions that could emerge in such an 
environment. 
A consequence of broader group boundaries is a reduced need or willingness to take 
advantage of punishment institutions to sanction those who may have defected. As punishment is 
costly, this can result in significant efficiency gains for global groups. Further, our results point 
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to the possibility of designing interventions to create opportunities for greater cooperation, 
sharing and exchange, among an existing group as part of broad-based policies to promote pro-
social actions and attitudes.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
Hidden-effort trust game: Instructions (punishment)   
<We presented these instructions on computer. Each Screen number below indicates the order of 
the screen on the computer. The subjects were able to navigate among screens as they wished.> 
Screen 1. 
In this game, you will keep the group membership you had in previous game.  
There are two roles in your pair, one person will be randomly assigned the role of A, and the 
other will be assigned the role of B. The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions by 
you and your matched participant. 
 
Screen 2.  
Period 1. Person A chooses between IN and OUT. If A chooses OUT, then A and B each 
receives $5.  
Next, each person B will choose between ROLL and DON’t ROLL (a die). Note that B will not 
know whether A has chosen IN or OUT; however, since B’s decision will only make a difference 
when A has chosen IN, we ask B’s to presume (for the purpose of making this decision) that A 
has chosen IN.  
If A has chosen IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, then B receives $14 and A receives $0.  
If B chooses ROLL, B receives $10 and the computer will roll a six-sided die to determine A’s 
payoff. If the die comes up 1, A receives $0; if the die equals to 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6, A receives $12. 
This information is summarized in the chart below.  
             
 
 
Both of you will be asked to make a decision:  
For Person A: Will you choose IN or OUT?  
For Person B: Will you choose ROLL or DON’T ROLL?  
 
Screen 3 
Before A knows B’s decision, we give A the chance to reduce B’s earnings conditional on A’s 
earnings.  
1. If A chose IN and received $0, A can choose to reduce B’s earnings by either 0 or $6.  
2. If A chose IN and received $12, then A cannot reduce B’s earnings.  
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3. If A chose OUT, A receives $5 for sure and A cannot reduce B’s earnings.  
In a word, A can reduce B’s earnings if A’s earnings can be influenced by B’s decision 
(indicate that A chose IN); and if A receives $0 as a result of this decision. The reduction 
decision will be enforced if A received $0. The deducted amount will not increase A’s earnings.  
 
 
Screen 4 
Period 2: In this period, you will play the same game as in Period 1, and with the same role (A 
or B) but with a new counterpart.  
You will not know what happened in Period 1 when you make your decisions in Period 2. But in 
Period 2, you are able to make your decisions baesd on possible outomce scenarios you may 
have had in Period 1.  
The next three pages will show you what it means to “make decisions based on possible Period 
1 outcome scenarios.”  
 
Screen 5 
For example, suppose you are assigned role A. In Period 1, you chose IN. When Period 2 starts, 
you will not know whether you have earned $0 or $12. Also, the role B participant will not know 
whether you chose IN or OUT, and therefore will not know their earnings as well.  
In Period 2, you are still assigned role A. When you again choose between IN and OUT for the 
new counterpart, you will choose whether to decide IN or OUT if you received $12 in Period 1, 
and also wehther to decide IN or OUT if you received $0.  
The next page will show you this example in detail.  
 
Screen 6  
The left figure presents one of A’s possible outcome in Period 1 when A chose IN: A received 
$12. The highlighted line indicates A chose IN. If A received $12 as a result of this choice, then 
B must have chosen ROLL, thus is also highlighted (in solid line).  
As A received $12 in this scenario, A is not provided the choice to reduce B’s earnings.  
In Period 2, assuming $12 is A’s Period 1 payoff, we ask A the same question here for A’s 
Period 2 counterpart (right figure)  
 
Scenario 1 
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Screen 7 
This page continue to present another possible outcome scenario when A chose IN: If A 
received $0.  
Without knowing B’s choice, either ROLL or DON’T ROLL is possible. So they are in dashed 
lines (left figure).  
A can choose to reduce B’s earnings by either $0 or $6.  
A will be asked the same question in Period 2 A had in Period 1 assuming A earned $0 in 
Period 1 (right figure).  
 
Scenario 2 
 
 
Screen 8 
Now let’s go over Period 2 decisions for Person B. Suppose you are assigned role B. If you 
chose ROLL with die roll outcome bigger than 1. A will not be given the choice to reduce your 
earnings.  
Or if you chose DON’T ROLL. Then if A chose OUT, both of you receives $5 regardless of your 
decision. A will not be given the choice to reduce your earnings.  
Or if A chose IN, then A receives $0 and A will then be given the choice to reduce B’s earnings.  
Since B will not know A’s reduction decision when B makes decision for his new counterpart in 
Period 2, we allow B to condition his decision on A’s reduction decision.  
1. Assuming A reduced my earnings by $0 . 
2.  Assuming A redcued my earnings by $6.  
Next page will show you an example.  
 
Screen 9 
Suppose B chose DON’T ROLL. The left figure presents one of B’s choices for A in Period 1. 
The highlighted line indicates B chose DON’T ROLL. If B received $14 as a result of this 
choice, then A must have chosen IN, thus IN is also highlighted.  
Meanwhile, A received $0 as a result of this decision. So A will be provided the choice to reduce 
B’s earnings.  
B will be asked the same question in Period 2 s/he had in Period 1 assuming B earned $14 in 
Period 1.  
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B will make his decision conditional on A’s reduction decision.  
 
 
Screen 10 
At the end of the experiment, either Period 1 or Period 2 will be randomly selected by the 
computer to determine your final payoff.  
If Period 1 is selected, the decisions made by A and B in Period 1 determine their payoff.  
If Period 2 is selectd, payoffs depend on the choices participants make in Period 2 under the 
corresponding outcome scenario that actually occurred in Period 1.  
This is the END of the instruction. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the 
experimenter will assit you. 
 
Puzzle game instruction  
Welcome. Today you will be participating in two experiments.  
The first experiment is a puzzle game.  
There is a sticker with your ID number on each of your screen. Please take if off and attach if on 
your shirt now. Half of you will have the TRIANGLE shaped sticker, and you belong to the 
TRIANGLE group; the other half of you will have the SQUARE shaped sticker belong to the 
SQUARE group.  
There is also an envelope on each of your table. Please do not open the envelope now.  
Now please stand up and look for your group members. 
What’s inside the envelope: Each of the envelopes contains FOUR pieces of cardboard. 
Here is the task for each group: 
1. The SQUARE group: to make SQUAREs. 
2. The TRIANGLE group: to make TRIANGLEs. 
The shape will be exactly the same as that of your sticker, but bigger. 
The task will not be complete until each one of you:  
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1.  The SQUARE group: make 5 squares of the same size.  
2. The TRIANGLE group: make 5 triangles of the same size. 
Group members are encouraged to share ideas and talk to each other during this exercise. 
Note that when making shapes, the cardboard cannot overlap each other.  
The winning team will receive $2 for each of their member.  
If both of the teams were able to form their shapes, then the one who was faster will receive the 
prize. If both failed to make the shapes, then none of the teams will receive the prize.  
You have 15 minutes to work on this task, when I start to time, you go to the work place now. If 
you finished, please raise your hand, the experimenter will check and will record the time your 
group have worked on the task. 
 
Appendix B 
Table B1: Demographic variables randomized in each condition 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES treatment treatment 
   
Black 0.150 0.181 
 (0.202) (0.195) 
Asian -0.048 -0.091 
 (0.156) (0.147) 
Hispanic -0.281 -0.228 
 (0.252) (0.251) 
Other  -0.274 -0.354 
 (0.369) (0.331) 
Male -0.034 -0.079 
 (0.130) (0.126) 
attachment -0.007  
 (0.026)  
Session dummies  Yes Yes 
 (0.129) (0.119) 
Constant 1.945*** 1.933*** 
 (0.182) (0.130) 
   
Observations 258 268 
R-squared 0.094 0.084 
 
Notes: The regression is based on the form: Treatment = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 +
𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟 where Covariate is listed to the left in the row and 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 are the session fixed effects 
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Caucasian has been dropped due to colinearlity. The p-value is based on robust standard error in 
parentheses. If we regress treatment status jointly on all covariates, we obtain a p-value for joint 
significance of 0.48 (without attachment) and 0.70 (with attachment)  
 
 
Table B2: Determinants of belief on trust (Probit regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 In-group Out-group 
VARIABLES All Non-social Social All Non-social Social 
       
believeb_roll_same_percent 2.103*** 2.094** 2.734***    
 (0.482) (0.860) (0.780)    
believeb_roll_other_percent    2.094*** 2.058*** 2.569*** 
    (0.480) (0.690) (0.582) 
Punishment -0.026 0.326 -0.653 -0.034 0.334 -0.420 
 (0.279) (0.350) (0.503) (0.267) (0.377) (0.427) 
Social group -0.180   0.179   
 (0.298)   (0.282)   
Male -0.172 -0.280 0.375 0.381 0.540 0.664 
 (0.291) (0.425) (0.554) (0.264) (0.385) (0.472) 
Session effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.190 -0.028 -1.766** -1.830*** -2.292** -1.691* 
 (0.740) (0.932) (0.736) (0.619) (0.948) (0.907) 
       
Observations 128 62 42 137 71 54 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The Control treatments  
We ran two additional control treatments, one with punishment, Control_P and the other without 
Control_NP to help identify the effect of punishment on trust. That is, in the main result 1, we find 
punishment to promote a non-social group’s trust towards out-group. But it is unclear, how much of this 
effect is due to the punishment effect alone (without group identity) and how much is due to its 
interaction effect with the group identity. A comparison between Control_NP and Control_P would 
identify the effect of punishment.   
            In the Control group (no group interaction before the trust game), punishment increases the 
willingness to trust, but this increase is not significant in comparison to the trust frequencies under the No 
Punishment (mean = 0.56) and Punishment conditions (mean = 0. 69, p = 0.31, two-sided M-W test). The 
significant effect of punishment on a Non-social group’s willingness to trust is largely driven by 
substantial out-group discrimination when punishment is absent. The trust in Control (mean = 0.56) is 
significantly higher than the Non-social group’s trust towards an out-group member (mean = 0.29, p < 
0.05, two-sided M-W test). However, Social group formation leaves members less likely to discriminate 
against out-groups. In particular, the trust of a Social-group member in an out-group trustee is statistically 
identical to that of a Control group member (mean = 0.59 vs. mean = 0.56, p = 0.83, two-sided M-W test).  
 
 
Figure A1: The Trust Frequency of Social, Non-Social and the Control groups. The grey 
bars show the trust of the control groups under No Punishment (Control_NP) and Punishment 
conditions (Control_P).  
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